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T

he US Department of Defense has pinned the military capacity of the nation
on hopes that as yet unproven technology will generate significant operational advantages. In the glow of the apparent effectiveness of “precision” munitions during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the department adopted strategies
that promise success through creation of massive technologically-oriented support structures that would make smaller field forces much more effective. The
Joint Staff in 1996 promulgated Joint Vision 2010, which listed high-tech capabilities it hoped to acquire.1 In 2000 the Joint Staff released a modified version
called Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020).2 Neither document provides much insight
about how such an end-state can be achieved.3 Nevertheless, the department believes that a revolution in military affairs (RMA) will dramatically, if miraculously, improve its capabilities, primarily through achievement of information
superiority, which it defines as “the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”4
Operational inadequacies, technical limitations, and fundamental institutional problems indicate that these dreams are doomed to fail, however. The
United States may be creating what historians will one day call the Maginot Line
of the 21st century. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and the early conduct
of the global war on terrorism do not indicate a change in this aspect of US defense policy.
The JV 2020 concept has four fundamental problems. Each is a potentially fatal flaw. Together, they virtually assure a financially inefficient force and
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disappointing field results. Against a competent enemy, the deficiencies may be
catastrophic:
l Narrow applicability. Despite paying lip service to a spectrum of missions, JV 2020 addresses only a small portion of US military activities. Desert
Storm-like operations are in the small part of the spectrum particularly amenable
to the RMA—medium-intensity conventional conflict against weak opponents.
l Vulnerable infrastructure. JV 2020 relies on information technology
(IT) and other infrastructures that are incompatible and unreliable. The infrastructures regularly fail in peacetime for many reasons. They offer abundant opportunities for enemy attack.
l Easy countermeasures. Even where the US has technical advantages,
effective countermeasures usually exist. In some cases these degrade US capabilities directly. In other instances, adversaries operate in politico-military arenas beyond the scope of US military capabilities, rendering the technology irrelevant.
l Institutional impediments. The US military cannot implement what it
wants to do even if funds and technology were available. The most daunting reasons are internal and institutional—and highly resistant to change.

Promises, Promises
JV 2020 promises operational effectiveness derived from a complex set
of hardware, software, and procedural systems. In the ideal world of JV 2020, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems like imagery satellites
would gather data that troops need to “see” areas of operations. Computers would
convert the data into visual displays of the battle space that provide a common operational picture. Because US forces would get more data more quickly than enemies, they would have information superiority. Possession of data would generate
good command and field operator decisions, and decision superiority. Communications networks would instantly transmit information and orders to troops, who
would promptly convert them into effective action. Precision munitions would
rain on targets. Victory would be assured. The story has fairy-tale appeal.
In the vision, US forces will be tied to interactive, or collaborative, networks that work continuously. Such network-centric warfare means that the
United States must maintain constant control of the land, sea, air, and space
through which US forces and communications travel and keep thousands of IT
systems functioning in unison. This is an enormous requirement never before at-
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tempted by any military organization. The United States does not do it well in
peacetime. There is no good reason to think the US military can achieve it while
fighting a competent enemy.
Technology is to help provide four basic capabilities of JV 2020, narrowly military in scope, which are to provide full-spectrum dominance through
achievement of information superiority:
l Dominant maneuver. US forces are to be able to move faster than enemies. This concept refers, effectively, to battlefield movement of conventional
combat forces against similar forces.5 However, it is not very helpful against
guerrilla adversaries because they are hard to find and/or identify. It is largely irrelevant to humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations because rapid
movement usually is not important in the sense of outmaneuvering an enemy.
l Precision engagement. US forces are to be able to hit targets accurately from far away. But against a weak opponent in 1999, much of American
airpower, cruise missiles, and hundreds of allied aircraft inflicted little damage
on the Yugoslav military; after-action reports indicate significant operational
and technical deficiencies.6 In late 2001 and early 2002, errant US munitions
killed allied troops and many Afghan civilians, and twice struck well-marked
Kabul facilities of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
l Focused logistics. The business processes part of JV 2020, this goal
aims to assure that troops have the gear they need. The United States is deficient
in many logistical areas, however. Perhaps the most important inadequacies are
the sea- and airlift needed to carry the massive quantities of supplies that US
forces like to have.7
l Full-dimensional protection. A reflection of the US military’s preoccupation with its own safety, this goal seeks to assure that enemies cannot
successfully attack US forces. While full protection is impossible, the military
nevertheless wants sensor/computer/weapon complexes that defend against
attacks. Operational architectures generally envision these capabilities surrounding fixed camps. Thus, the US Army occupies a fortress at Camp Bondsteel
in Kosovo—hampering its operational effectiveness—while the US Air Force
retreated after the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing to an airbase deep in the
Saudi desert.8

Why This Approach?
Why has DOD adopted such a limited approach? The lessons of Desert
Storm that provoked JV 2020 came from an extraordinary conflict. An inept, demoralized Iraqi army let its enemies assemble forces unmolested for six months,
then allowed them to attack on their schedule. The geographical and atmospheric
conditions of Kuwait and Iraq—generally good weather and largely flat, barren
terrain—were well suited to use of precision munitions. Iraq ceded control of the
air, then placed much of its armor and other key assets in fixed locations that were
easy to find and hit. The result was similarly unusual—clear victory with few al90
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lied casualties. No wonder the generals want to fight this war again! The abnormality of Desert Storm should be apparent to even beginning students of military
history and strategy.
The technology envisioned in JV 2020 cannot enhance the performance
of troops in most US military operations because it focuses predominantly on
gathering and processing information about the weapons, equipment, and tactics
of conventional military forces—friendly and enemy. Technology contributes
virtually nothing, however, to complex civil-military operations—like recent
ones in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo in which the US military has not performed particularly well.9
Technology has little applicability to political and many military situations for elementary reasons. Sensors track physical things and activities that
have electromagnetic and other signatures. Sensors cannot identify human motives, measure human emotions, quantify the coherence of human organizations,
or assess the importance of the data they gather; they can provide limited
amounts of relevant data to people for analysis if they are so targeted. This is a
big “if,” because US intelligence is heavily focused on supporting commanders
who are mainly concerned with force protection and their specific military
missions. Technology-based “analyst tools” have been marginally helpful and
show little promise of soon becoming more than data manipulators. Moreover,
DOD devotes few resources to, and places less emphasis on, building the political sophistication its people need to use information well.10

Fragile and Vulnerable Infrastructure
DOD’s IT infrastructure is expensive, limited in capabilities, subject to
chronic technical and operator-induced failures, and vulnerable to attack. The
department recognizes many of the specific problems, but has not systematically
assessed the costs and limitations in conjunction with expected advantages. The
issues are numerous:
l DOD is working to protect critical systems through its Critical Infrastructure Protection and Information Assurance programs, but single points of
failure and vulnerabilities to enemy attack and industrial accidents remain.
l DOD relies on its multibillion-dollar Global Positioning Satellite
(GPS) network to provide locations for forces and guidance for most precision
munitions. But GPS signals are weak and easily jammed. The Russian company
Aviaconversia offers a four-watt GPS jammer commercially for less than
$4,000.11 Some observers believe that jammers effective over ten-mile radiuses
can be built for $400 from parts available at retail electronics stores.12 US forces
are poorly equipped even to identify the existence of jamming.13
l Some 95 percent of US military communications travel over commercial telecommunications networks, including satellite systems, which are
subject to interdiction. To reduce vulnerabilities in space, a presidential commission chaired by Donald Rumsfeld (before he became the Bush Administration’s
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“The United States may be creating what
historians will one day call the
Maginot Line of the 21st century.”

Secretary of Defense) advocated substantial, but unspecified, new expenditures
on space activities.14 Later, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld called for initiatives
that would militarize space for the first time, with unforeseeable but probably
negative political and military consequences; such initiatives seem unlikely to
assure the security of US reconnaissance and communications systems.15
l The DOD IT infrastructure, including its intelligence infrastructure,
regularly fails during normal operations without help from enemies. A particularly
serious failure virtually shut down the headquarters of the National Security
Agency (NSA) at Fort Meade, Maryland, for over three days starting in the evening of 24 January 2000.16 The outage left the United States virtually deaf for what
is, in the intelligence business, a long time. NSA Director Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden was so concerned at the time that he ordered NSA people to keep
the failure secret.17 Said Stephen B. Tate, chief of NSA’s Strategic Directions
Team, “Our information technology infrastructure is a critical part of our mission
and it needs some repair. . . . It is a burning platform and we’ve got to fix it.”18
l DOD extensively uses commercial off-the-shelf software. This practice, while having many advantages, also provides potential attackers access during peacetime to key parts of DOD’s networks—giving them time to develop
attack strategies and to plant malicious software for activation later.
l Hackers and US “red teams” trying to identify vulnerabilities have
attacked the infrastructure with ease. DOD reported 22,144 attacks on its unclassified systems in 1999, and in late 2000 indicated that the rate of attacks was up
about ten percent over the previous year.19 In March 1998, DOD detected a group
of hackers who eventually attacked hundreds of US government networks; despite mounting an extensive operation code-named Moonlight Maze, investigators three years later had learned little of the attackers and had failed to stop the
attacks.20 Carnegie Mellon University’s Computer Emergency Response Center
estimates that only about ten percent of attacks are detected. In Joint Staff exercises Eligible Receiver in 1997 and Zenith Star in 1999, NSA personnel successfully entered a variety of DOD networks and US civilian networks controlling
electric power grids and 911 emergency response networks.21 Michael Vatis, former chief of the National Infrastructure Protection Center, says the threat of
cyber attack is growing daily and that there is no known way of protecting against
some types of attack.22
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Parameters

l “Secure” networks are vulnerable. NSA personnel have identified
theoretical vulnerabilities of the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNet) that carries much of the military’s command and control communications via the Global Command and Control System, as well as other sensitive
information.23 The creation of large networks increases both vulnerability and
the potential damage an incompetent soldier, malcontent, or enemy agent can
cause. In August 2001, a retired US Air Force sergeant was arrested for allegedly
selling to Libya documents he obtained from the top-secret Intelink website. In
the world of network-centric operations, there is no better espionage or sabotage
recruit than a system administrator for a key command and control or intelligence
system. Recruitment of an employee is not necessary, however. The chronic lack
of computer discipline that leads to periodic introduction of computer viruses
into secure networks also gives enemies opportunities to use unwitting but careless Americans to place malicious software in key places.24

Easy and Effective Countermeasures
Potential US military opponents have doubtless noted the limitations of
US capabilities, have countermeasures, and are planning other ways to overcome
US strengths. Among the public comments and actions of potential adversaries:
l Chinese military strategists have written that attacks on space communications and computer networks, including civilian infrastructure, could be
part of a successful attack strategy.25
l Information operations aimed at civilian decisionmakers—not their
computers—can alter US military rules of engagement (ROE) and decisions to
use force. Effective information operations against nonmilitary targets can render US military capabilities irrelevant—by preventing their deployment—or
change US operational objectives or ROE to the advantage of those manipulating
US perceptions. These include putative friends; Bosnian Muslims waged a sophisticated propaganda campaign that portrayed themselves as innocent victims
of Serb aggression during the Bosnian civil war of 1992-95, gaining strategically
important US support that continues. Israel has mastered this technique at
substantial financial, political, and, since 11 September 2001, human cost to
the United States.26 The Yugoslav government targeted Western political
decisionmaking during NATO’s war against Yugoslavia—and came close to
winning the war by convincing Western societies to stop an allegedly illegal and
ill-advised war. US Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Short, chief of
NATO’s air campaign, complained publicly about the political directives that
formed his ROE, suggesting that he did not understand the impact of information
operations on his force.27 NATO Commander General Wesley Clark, by contrast,
understood these ramifications but could not do much about either NATO
political guidance or the nations’ military responses to the guidance—including
US responses.28 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) used the internet to
orchestrate the 1997 land mine treaty over US objections. Osama bin Laden and
Winter 2002-03
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his allies have extensively used information operations, aided by errant US air
strikes, to portray the US war against the Taliban as a crusade against Islam.
Meanwhile, DOD is fixated on a definition of information operations that focuses on computer network attacks.
l Use of unconventional methods and tactics do not expose US enemies to the mass of US military power. Many of these alternative approaches, including attack on the US military information infrastructure, are inexpensive by
many definitions, including political cost. The Defense Department euphemistically calls some of these approaches “asymmetric threats.”
l Ways of avoiding the sensors the United States uses to achieve “information superiority” are well known. The Soviet Union called this complex of
techniques maskirovka. Orbits of US intelligence satellites are posted on the
internet, making evasive measures relatively easy. “Deception and denial”
techniques are in common use; associated with hills, forests, clouds, and rain,
they regularly foiled US sensors over Yugoslavia in 1999. There are no immediate prospects for overcoming these facts of nature. Moreover, many aspects
of unconventional warfare are not susceptible to monitoring by traditional
sensors. Forces have but to disperse among civilians and have communications
discipline in order to be all but invisible to sensors—as members of the Taliban
have shown yet again. NSA has publicly lamented changes in the telecommunications industry—including the use of fiber-optic cables and encryption—that
degrade its traditional capabilities.29 Precision munitions cannot hit targets they
cannot identify.
The combination of the easy evasion of sensors and cheap countermeasures makes war of attrition an attractive strategy for potential US enemies—at
first blush an incongruous strategy for conflict against the world’s military superpower and wealthiest country.30 However, the United States has relatively few of
the expensive precision weapons it likes, while America’s dearth of collective
patience and self-discipline is legendary. Combined with the imperatives of
force protection, the ISR, financial, and sometimes political costs of even mundane US operations are high. This means that enemies can devise strategies to run
US troops and intelligence processing capabilities ragged while protecting their
own forces. Opponents can take deception actions that lead US forces to waste
scarce precision munitions on low-value targets. Adversaries also can use information operations to bully the United States into policies and actions they
want—like forcing Washington to order an unseemly, hasty withdrawal of 800
US Marines from an exercise in Jordan in June 2001 due to concerns about force
protection. If they can kill a few GIs and plant doubts in the minds of US
decisionmaking constituencies, even weak opponents—as defined in traditional
military terms—reasonably can expect to defeat the United States. Yugoslavia
nearly accomplished the feat in 1999.31 Surely many states and groups are studying ways to exploit US politico-military vulnerabilities.
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Institutional Impediments Cannot Be Overcome
Even if engineers achieve the technical goals of JV 2020, DOD has
systemic institutional deficiencies that would prevent fielding of operationally
effective technology. Military attitudes, doctrine, and inertia would prevent effective operation of even limited RMA-inspired technology.
The sheer size and organizational complexity of the DOD IT infrastructure make achievement and maintenance of interoperability and security a daunting task—without the complication of attacks. DOD has over 10,000 computer
systems, of which its component agencies have designated about 2,300 as
“mission-critical.” DOD has some 1.5 million individual computers, most of
which are networked; to keep abreast of changing technology, about a third are replaced each year. Software is upgraded regularly. Hundreds of organizations procure and operate the equipment. Even the massive effort to prepare the department
for Year 2000 (Y2K) produced only crude DOD-wide lists of important IT assets.32
The lack of centralized accounting of DOD equipment means that there
is not and, given current institutional arrangements, cannot be “enterprise” management of DOD’s IT. While the loose confederation of fiefdoms with parochial
interests works most of the time in the pluralistic society that is the Department of
Defense, the physics of network communications is much less tolerant of incompatible technical designs and inconsistent execution. The fractured design and
control of DOD’s IT infrastructure creates opportunities for attackers.
l Acquisition failings. Despite unified acquisition procedures as outlined in DOD Directive 5000-series documents, other Defense efforts to achieve
department-wide system interoperability, and homilies about the virtues of
jointness, the services and Defense agencies refuse to obey the spirit and letter of
sometimes long-standing policies and continue to buy systems for their use
alone.33 In late 2000, some $36 billion in planned acquisition reportedly would
not be interoperable.34 During the war against Yugoslavia, US forces used some
30 ISR systems that, according to the Defense Science Board, were only “integrated into a loose federation of collection capabilities.”35
Program managers of key systems are not responsible for assuring interoperability with other systems. Indeed, they would be “out of their lanes” if
they tried. While nominally the organizational chief information officers and
agency heads have such responsibilities, in practice the acquisition of single systems occurs largely independently. This sometimes leads to what some DOD IT
professionals call “drive-by fieldings”—surprise delivery of IT for which users
are neither technically nor financially prepared.
For the same reasons, program managers and their agencies do not systematically address enterprise-wide consequences of their systems, including
basic ones like the impact of their systems on the IT infrastructure and the impact
on DOD’s limited stock of IT professionals. Often they do not care whether there
is adequate bandwidth to operate their systems; that is somebody else’s problem.
Winter 2002-03
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“Even the United States cannot continue to build
massive technological tails in support of
deployed forces in the hope of ensuring only
comfortable and safe missions.”

They similarly do not assess how attackers could cripple their systems or have
responsibility for the consequences of such attacks.
Compounding the consequences of a lack of interoperability are the minimal development and practice of continuity of operations plans. Program managers sometimes develop technical aids for users and operate help desks, but they
have no responsibility for assuring the integration of their systems with others, or
for users’ operation of their systems. Operators of equipment, particularly unit
commanders, are supposed to develop operational contingency plans—ways to
assure that they can continue to perform key functions by alternative means. But
preparations for Y2K found that many of these plans are incomplete, superficial,
or unrehearsed.36 To address this issue following the big NSA outage, thenAssistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Money directed drafting of new policy.37
Given the time needed to develop and exercise such plans, DOD is far from able
to overcome losses of key systems.
Elements of DOD and the US intelligence community recognize these
deficiencies and have limited programs to address them. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is working on a Global Information Grid concept, for example,
and the intelligence community management staff is working to improve system
architectures and inter-agency cooperation. However, agency compliance remains voluntary and there is no prospect for coordinated efforts for the foreseeable future.
l Erroneous notion of the value of data. Explicit in DOD’s definition
of information superiority is a belief that the acquisition and transmission of information alone produce military power. This is not true.
Troops must acquire adequate background knowledge and understanding of their areas of responsibility before they deploy in order to be able to convert
the incremental bits that their sensors and other intelligence sources give them into
useful information. US troops rarely make such preparations. The military seldom
performs even the second-best solutions of assigning functional experts to commanders’ staffs. As a result, personnel unfamiliar with their operational surroundings chronically are overwhelmed with data and intelligence analyses because
they cannot distinguish important messages from fluff. Worse, they sometimes are
96
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content to ignore the information and expert advice that are available to them.38
Area experts, by contrast, often lament shortages of useful information because
they understand the limitations of the reporting they receive and know what they
need to understand local complexities. Awareness of local conditions is important
even for warfighters in conventional operations. US troops deal with coalition
partners, local politicians, and civilians who have agendas. They must understand
the military consequences of the political aims and tactics of their enemies, and appreciate the diplomatic consequences of their own actions.
The information needs of military forces vary greatly according to their
size, organization, training, doctrine, and objectives. Well-trained special operations forces, including terrorists, usually need little real-time communications
because they typically decentralize control of operations. The 11 September hijackers evidently communicated little but were “superior” that day. By contrast,
forces with large support tails may need volumes of communications. The US
military uses huge PowerPoint briefings, with fancy graphics on each slide, to conduct basic command and control; it requires substantial IT and communications
resources just to muddle along. Thus, the United States can have massive information superiority as measured by the volume of data collected and communicated,
but be far less operationally effective than its enemies.
The creation of large sensor and communications capabilities requires
US military dominance over large parts of world. The pursuit of dominance now
is widely called American “hegemony” and is widely resented—by states like
China and also by friends and allies. The quest for information superiority is consequently both exacerbating world tensions and increasing DOD’s conviction
that it needs such alleged superiority. It is a spiral that threatens to become increasingly expensive, both financially and politically, and may contribute to the
outbreak of hostilities.39
l Retention of IT professionals. DOD’s recruitment and retention of IT
professionals have been so ineffective in recent years that a working group
chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is addressing the issue. There is no solution in sight. DOD cannot now conduct normal
IT operations well, let alone surge to support a national emergency or reconstitute following attacks.
l Culture. Members of the US military, despite defeat in Somalia and
marginal performances in the 1990s in Haiti and the Balkans, believe they constitute the best military in the world. While surely the United States can put munitions
on any place on the planet through sheer mass of resources, there is no corresponding superiority of individual troops or units—and, more important, no superiority
of operational result. There is no public evidence that the cruise missile attack on
Khartoum, Sudan, in August 1998—a classic RMA operation—hit anything of
significance; it certainly did not offset the associated diplomatic costs. Yet JV 2020
is a virtual article of faith in DOD. The root cause is simple arrogance. The American military chronically believes itself to be a superior group possessing superior
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technology. A generation ago, many Americans thought they and their technology
were superior to the peasants of Vietnam; the United States paid the price for this
hubris and its other judgmental errors in the Vietnam War.
The National Security Agency is an intriguing test case of the struggle
between a reformer and bureaucratic inertia. NSA director Hayden reportedly
concluded that the root causes of NSA’s major IT failure in early 2000 were managerial in nature; for example, NSA then had five largely autonomous directorates and 68 e-mail systems at Fort Meade alone.40 Hayden attacked leadership
problems by bringing in new senior managers, reorganizing, and developing new
technology in a program called Trailblazer. In July 2001, NSA finalized its
“Groundbreaker” program of outsourcing IT by awarding a $2 billion, ten-year
contract to Computer Sciences Corporation. These efforts generated internal
resistance; Hayden advisor James Adams estimates that 25 percent of NSA
personnel support Hayden, another 25 percent oppose him, and the rest are fencesitting.41 Meanwhile, Secretary Rumsfeld in mid-2001 encountered military
opposition to his review of national defense priorities and opined that, for the
military, “change is hard.”42 Under the best of circumstances, even vigorous reform efforts will bear fruit slowly. Many agency heads are not even trying.
l Excuse for “force protection.” The putative advantages of JV 2020
provide the military with something it wants very much—a rationale for avoiding the messy business of combat and other operations that may result in casualties and require hard work. JV 2020 offers technology-based justification for
force protection policies that effectively place the protection of US troops over
the accomplishment of the mission without admitting to laziness or cowardice.
Engineers promise that troops can have the best of all worlds—safety, personal
convenience, and easy victory.
Force protection imperatives have generated massive demands on the
military’s ISR and IT networks. Collection systems once devoted to strategic national information requirements now, to a large degree, provide tactical intelligence designed to assure that a limited number of troops remain protected. Thus,
hypothetically, to support the flight of four aircraft over Iraq, the US Central
Command might task the satellites of the National Reconnaissance Office to provide data to NSA and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, which would
rapidly process the data into signals and imagery intelligence that would show
that Iraqi surface-to-air missile batteries still do not threaten pilots. Multiplied
around the world, mundane tactical demands on expensive strategic assets extensively task the US intelligence community. The financial cost is enormous, but
one can only speculate about the opportunity costs these short-term projects that
produce perishable intelligence impose on the development of knowledge and
understanding that the United States requires to identify genuine crises. It is no
coincidence that the greatest admitted US failing in the early stages of its war
against terrorism is a shortage of human intelligence—a resource that virtually
by definition cannot be procured by technology.
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l Serving the combatant commanders. The legal status of regional
combatant commanders gives them significant operational independence in their
areas of operation. This power encourages them to demand DOD-wide resources
on a priority basis because, using the logic of Lake Woebegone, they all have missions of above average importance. The combatant commanders’ powers preclude meaningful department-wide planning of the use of ISR assets and enable
them to resist “enterprise” management of information and other assets. Moreover, their voracious and undisciplined appetites for information and IT—
largely for force protection—are not constrained by the government’s abilities to
satisfy them. DOD has no systemic, rational way to adjudicate these and other
conflicting demands.43
l Lack of measures of effectiveness. The Defense Department has no
measures of effectiveness to help it assess how well current or planned technologies work in operational contexts—let alone whether they are worth their financial and opportunity costs. DOD is fundamentally ignorant about how the
department’s assets work together, and which result in meaningful contributions, because it has no functional cost accounting system. DOD has failed to
comply with the Clinger-Cohen Act of January 1996, which mandates that federal agencies use fairly standard private sector techniques to measure the effectiveness of IT investments. In order to assess the cost-effectiveness of new
programs, decisionmakers must understand the value and effectiveness of the
existing assets the new IT will interface with or replace.
Were measures of effectiveness available—ones that include opportunity costs within DOD, the diplomatic costs of perceived US hegemony, and
imputed costs of operational vulnerabilities across the range of operational
scenarios—one might be able to calculate the cost-effectiveness of military technology. Without them, I hypothesize that in high-intensity combat, competent
opponents will be able to disrupt US networks, causing massive command and
control failures and very poor cost-effectiveness. Similarly, in a nuclear environment, electromagnetic pulses would wreak havoc on computers and networks
that are not hardened. Conventional devices also can disrupt the electrical systems so critical to DOD. Such outages would create chaos because our personnel are not conditioned to operate, psychologically or doctrinally, without their
electronic crutches.
In low-intensity combat and peacetime operations, the gadgets of RMA
simply are unlikely to have much effect. This means that the huge opportunity
costs of JV 2020—smaller forces with a reduced ability to recover from unexpected defeats or to accommodate unusually large demands for their services, a reduced intelligence targeting of political actors, doctrinal blinders, and
others—will lead to modestly negative net contributions in most operations.
Only in medium-intensity conventional conflict against weak opponents might
US military technology be cost-effective.
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“The deficiencies of JV 2020 are so
overwhelming that DOD should abandon it.”

Even RMA successes create new categories of weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Enhanced connectivity already increases the generals’ ability to micromanage tactical operations from afar—a propensity they have demonstrated
repeatedly with lesser communications capabilities—to the detriment of initiative,
operational performance, and the morale and retention of junior officers. Technology also enables undisciplined “cruise missile diplomacy,” like the 1998 strikes on
Khartoum and Afghanistan, that feel good for a time but accomplish little and have
harmful long-term diplomatic costs. So much for “decision superiority.”

Can DOD Escape the Trap?
DOD has created a conundrum for itself. Its electronic system-based
force structure is expensive, fragile, and vulnerable, but system architectures are
not easy to change. Rapidly evolving technology and the independent decisions
of members of the DOD confederacy assure that enterprise-wide interoperability
will not occur soon. But because DOD envisions an interconnected “system of
systems” and the services and Defense agencies generally are moving in that
direction (though marching to the beat of different drummers), retrenching in
just a few areas is not a workable option. Even a single major lapse in performance or a gap in communication between organizations that depend upon each
other defeats the purpose of the overall concept. Therefore, a decision to move
away from JV 2020 would require a coordinated effort nearly as large as the
one to create JV 2020. Key aspects of a redesign of DOD include equipment,
doctrine, and training the force—core functions that cannot be changed quickly,
easily, or inexpensively.
DOD’s basic problem is leadership. As a recent Center for Strategic and
International Studies report on the US military concluded, while most individual
problems and challenges are solvable, the systemic deficiency is leadership.44
The most difficult problems include: the power of vested interests; narrow and
parochial outlooks of IT specialists in charge of most IT development; infatuation with technology in general; the propensity of personnel in a “zero-defect”
culture to accept even bad guidance; and the debilitating effects on military ethics resulting from the technologists’ promises of easy victories and comfortable
lives. Secretary Rumsfeld’s program to “transform” DOD, while commendable
in intent, barely addresses the fundamental institutional problems and pushes the
department to use yet more gadgetry.45
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Requirements for a New “Vision”
The deficiencies of JV 2020 are so overwhelming that DOD should
abandon it. Yet the fiasco of current policy is no reason for DOD to overreact and
become Luddite. While JV 2020 is fundamentally flawed, the evolving technologies that stimulated it are critical to the future of US military power. It is important to recognize them, to know how to use them, and to know how to defend
against them. How, then, can DOD wisely adapt to a changing technological
world in ways that foster national security and foreign policy objectives? The
United States should:
l Most important, abandon the notion that military objectives may be
won or made easy and costless through the use of technology. Improvements in
technology can help US forces, but the quality of people and their institutions is
more important than technology.46
l Abandon integrated networks that mandate collaboration except
where they are clearly effective—perhaps for naval forces. Instead, create electronic systems that support tailored unit- or mission-specific needs. Use networks in support of operations, but eliminate total dependence upon them. By
doing so, make organizations and individuals capable of independent actions
consistent with collective plans.
l Alter doctrine and train forces to use information and IT as aids, not
crutches. US military folklore places the American fighting man’s ability to operate independently in support of the commander’s intent as second-to-none.
While the legend is not entirely supported by history, it is certainly a standard
worth emphasizing.
l Use technology only when its benefits demonstrably exceed the sum
of all its costs. Accomplishing this means that DOD would have to comply, finally, with the Clinger-Cohen Act. It may also mean accepting casualties rather
than straining ISR systems in support of force protection to the point that the effectiveness of the department is degraded, US foreign policy interests are damaged, and the nation is endangered. Even the United States cannot continue to
build massive technological tails in support of deployed forces in the hope of ensuring only comfortable and safe missions.
l Radically change recruiting, training, doctrine, and career management policies to improve the capacity of military personnel and organizations to
use information. While there is sometimes information overload, the main problem is that many military users cannot distinguish critical information from junk
data. DOD should work harder to improve the capabilities of its people—not just
procure more mediocre software tools designed to do the thinking for them. This
means creating and sustaining a more intellectually sophisticated military force
and requiring that IT professionals produce products that are genuinely useful.
47
l Make the US military less vulnerable to attack. This may mean
using less RMA-inspired technology.
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l Radically redesign the Department of Defense. There is no possibility of unified effort until there is fundamental change in the institutional structure
of DOD. Congress must act first. Title 10 of the US Code, which gives the services authority for training and equipping their forces, should be radically reformed. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 should be revisited. The Secretary
needs to gain much better control over the services and Defense agencies that
nominally work for him. Finally, military and civilian leaders need to revitalize a
culture that in many ways is dysfunctional.
These reforms are unlikely to occur in the absence of a significant US
battlefield defeat. Organizations that agree on little within the Pentagon close
ranks when collectively challenged. The military services have significant lobbying clout on Capitol Hill and powerful supporters in reserve and veterans organizations. Policymakers and the citizenry should continue to expect poor
military performance and avoid—for a myriad of reasons—policies that run the
risk of major war. The best we probably can hope for is a moderate conflict in
which the inadequacies of JV 2020 are obvious but the United States does not suffer disastrous defeat. Hundreds of lives and the associated diplomatic and domestic political ramifications of a defeat will probably be part of this awakening.
We can but hope the cost will not be higher.
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